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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 





BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
~~ .\ TE~fENT 0 F THE CA.AE 
Case No. 
9546 
This appeal is brought by appellant from an order 
denyjng theo appellant's motion for a ne'v trial, as en-
tered by the Honorable C~harles <+. (~o"'"ley, District 
Judge, in the Second Judicial District, In and For W eher 
(jonnt~'"· No Pvidence '"as offered at the hearing. 
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·The app·ellant is hereinafter referred to as Defend-
ant and the Respondent, State, as they appeared below. 
The Defendant was charged with the crime of Second 
Degree Burglary. At trial, where the jury had been 
,, ... aived, the Defendant was found guilty and was conse-
quently sentenced, in the absence of his attorney, to serve 
not more than twenty years. Defendant had, prior to the 
imposition of sentence, retained the services of the coun-
sPl who now represents him on appeal. During trial, De-
fe·ndant 'vas represented by another attorney. 
Prior to the filing of this appeal, present counsel for 
the Defendant moved for a ne"\v trial on the ground that 
defendant " .. R~ denied due proces~ of the la'v in that: 
1. ( 1ounsel rPpresenting the Defendant at the trial 
"\Yas ineon1petent and Defendant therefore "\vas denied 
effPetiYf) repre~entation. 
~- The rri1nP of Second Degree Burglary "\\'"as never 
e~tahlished in that the State failed to prove that the 
bur~dar\" \\·n~ eonnnitt(\tl at nig·ht. 
• L_.; 
3. Drfendnnt "\Yas denied the right to have counsel 
]lresent at the ti1ne thP judg1nent \\'"H~ rendered and the 
~'en ten(l·f\ i 111 pn~0d. 
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3 
The District Judge denied the motion and defendant 
proRf'eut~s this appeal. 
The appe11ant raises the following points. 
POJ"\TT I. 
THE DIS'TRICT COURT DENIED DEFENDANT THE 
FAIR TRIAL PROVIDED FOR BY THE DUE PROCESS 
CLAUSE OF THE UTAH CONSTITU'TION AND CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES IN DENYING DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED ON THE 
GROUND OF INCOMPETENCY OF COUNSEL. 
POINT II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDG-
MENT AND IMPOSING SENTENCE UPON 'THE CHARGE 
OF SECOND DEGREE BURGLARY NOTWITHSTANDING 
TI-lE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE CRIME WAS 
COMMITT'ED AT NIGH1T. 
POINT III. 
THE DISTRICT ·COURT DENIED DEFENDANT THE 
FAIR TRIAL PROVIDED FOR BY THE DUE PROCESS 
CLAUSE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE CON-
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STITUTION O·F THE UNITED STA'TES IN IMPOSING 




THE DISTRICT COURT DENIED DEFENDANT THE 
FAIR TRIAL PROVIDED FOR BY THE DUE PROCESS 
CLAUSE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES IN DENYING DE,FEND-
ANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED ON THE 
GROUND OF INCOMPETENCY OF COUNSEL. 
The appellant bases this appeal upon the follo"ring 
("Onstitutional provi~ion~: 
AMENDMENT,,.~ C10XSTITlTTIOX OF THE 
l~XIT·ED STATES: 
''X o person shall be held to answer for a 
capital or oth.erwise infamous crime ... nor de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, 'Yithout due 
process of ln,v. . . . ~, 
A~fEXD1\fl~:KT, \TT~ COX~TITl1TION OF THE 
1 ~K fTI~D ST A rr11~S: 
... ln all cri1ninal prosecutions, the accused 
~hall have the right ... to have th~ a8i~istance of 
eoun~el for hi~ defen~P.~' 
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' 
AMENDMENT XT,r, SEC. 1, CONSTITUTION 
1TNTTED STATES: 
''(N)or shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property without due process 
of law. . . . ., 
.\RTICLE I, SE,C. 12, r:T AH CONSTITUTION 
Hln criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person 
and by coun~r~l. . . '' 
.. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property \vithout due proc.eHs of la\v." 
Briefly revie,ving the trial and other pertinent pro-
ceedings, \Ve find that the case is fraught with irregulari-
tiPs " .. hirh "rarrant the closest srrutiny, for although these 
discrepancies may not he, in and of themselves, such as 
"'"ould justify appellate redress~ the sum total of these 
irregularities appear to have contributed heavily to the 
verdict and judgment, in "'"hich ease the Defendant should 
c0rtnin ly he grantP(l a. nP'V triaL 
.:\ t the ouh.;et "Te find that rounHel " .. aived a prelimi-
narv hearing (R. 3). This, of course, could he attributed 
• L_ 
to ~trate~y. YPt. in esseneP. nnlP~s good reasons are 
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6 
manifest for waiving the preliminary hearing, it would 
seem that defense counsel waived Defendant's right to 
one of the most instrumental and perhaps the only dis-
covery device in a criminal proceeding. Also, by this 
\vaiver, counsel for the Defendant waived the Defendant's 
right to demand that the State prove "probable cause" 
that a crime had been committed and that Defendant com-
mitted the rrime. It 'vould not seem material that by 
retrospect, we find that the Defendant \Yas found guilty 
of the crime; he nevertheless was entitled to demand that 
the State prove "probable cause" before it could bind him 
over for trial: A preliminary hearing is a precious 
and substantial right, to be jealously guarded, and to 
be 'vaived only upon request by the Defendant himself, 
or \\7 here it 'vould not serve the purposes previously 
~tated, or "There the Defendant intends to enter a plea 
of guilty. Thi~ does not appPar to be ~uch a. case. 
ln next focusing our attention to the trial, an analy-
HlS of the trial records reveal~ the follo\\ing c.ourse of 
conduct: 
1. The jury 'va~ ".,.aived by defense counsel (R. 10). 
2. X o opening ~tate1nent ".,.as presented for the de-
fpn~P. 
:t CounRel failed to object to evidenr.e "Thich appar-
(\ntl~" "·as illegally obtained (R. 24--lG). 
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-• 
4. Only one of SIX state's 'vitnesses was cross-
examined (R. 24-7). 
5. Counsel failed to attempt to impeach State's 
princ.ipal "\\'"itness 'vho was an established felon (R. 24-
14 ). 
6. The trial eourt found it necessary to establish the 
county in which the crime was committed because of de-
fense counsel's failure to compel the State to do so (R. 
24-26). 
7. X o witnesses or evidence 'vere presented in De-
fendant'~ behalf. 
8. N" o closing argun1ent W'"as made hy defense counsel 
(R. 24-23). 
9. Defense counsel failed to comp!el the State to es-
tablish whether the crime 'vas committed at night or 
during daylight hours and to prove that the crime was 
proper}~,. burglary· in the second degree,, not in the third 
degree (R. 2-l:-9). (Thi~ last iten1 \Yill be discussed more 
fully in the arg1.11nent of Point II.) 
Again, these irregularities 1nay not, independently, 
be Hufficient to justify a trial de novo, yet "\\'"hen all of 
these disc.repancie~ appear in a single ease, the only logi-
cal conch~~ion i~ that Defendant did not receive effective 
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and competent representation. In effect, Defendant had 
no representation. If "~e arrive at any other conclusion 
\\'"e 'vould, in e~~ence, be adopting the rule that the terrn 
"'representation hy eounS'el" merely n1eans physical or 
perfunctory representation. 
To ~ubstantiate the argument that Defendant "\\.,.as not 
con1pletely and effectively represented by counsel at trial~ 
".,.e need only to allude to the transcript of the trial. The 
total efforts of defense counsel during thi~ entire pro-
ePPding ":rere: 
1. The cross-examining of one "itness. 
2. Objectin?: to four questions. 
This~ hy any ~tandard~ does not seen1 to qualify defense 
(·oun~rr~ condtH·t n~ effectiYt)_. ~nb~tnntial or cou1petent 
~'OUll~(•]illQ.'. 
To quote Judge \\ .... alter E. Hoff1nan, District Judge 
of the I.,.n1terl ~tates Di~tr1ct ( 10nrt for the Eastern Dis-
trict nf \~irginia. 
• ~rrhe entire trial in the court belo'v had the 
Pa r1nn rk~ of an e.r }JO rte proreeding. If Defendant 
had been ""'ithout the servirP~ of an attorney, but 
had re1nained ntute, it is unlikely that he 'vould 
have been ""'or~e off." ,Johns r. 8nu1fh~ 176 F. 
~upp. 9-!9, 953, ( 1959). 
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In Johns v. Smyth, counsel for Defendant waived 
opening staternent, failed to request instructions on the 
Defendant's behalf, failed to introduce evidence for De-
fendant's case, and failed to present a closing argwnent. 
These discrepancies are practically identical to those in 
the case before the Court. If any distinctions are to be 
rnade between Johns v. Srnyth and this case, the distinc-
tion would be that in the case before this Court, Defend-
ant presents a stronger and more convincing argument. 
Granted that perhaps the motivating factors whieh may 
have led to counsel's rnisconduct in both cases may differ. 
ln the Johns' Case, counsel's misconduct was attributed 
to his "conscious belief that the Defendant was guilty of 
the e.rime charged." In the present case, the reason for 
rotmsel's rnisconduct is not known. Nevertheless, the 
1notive behind counsel's ineffectiveness is not the gov~rn­
ing factor in determining "Thether Defendant was effec-
tively, eomp·et'ently, and substantially represented by 
r.otmsel. . Our p·rimary concern is "rhether, irresp~eetive 
of motives, counsel in fact undertook the defensP to the 
best of his ability. 
In State ex rei Parker v. Jameson, 75 R.D. 196, 61 
X.W. 2d 832, 833, (1953) the Court stated: 
"A la":yer, 'vhether paid or not, whether un-
~ympathetic and disbelieving his client's case or 
not, whether the offense alleged i~ abhorrent or 
in high disfavor "Tith current public vie"r or not, 
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is bound by the ethics of his profession and our 
judicial system to present the cause of the de-
se,rving and the despicable defPndant '''ith equal 
] ~' zea. 
Can ,-re still logically maintain that, not,vithstanding 
all of the irregularities which the trial record reveals, 
Defendant 'vas effectively, competently, and substantially 
repres1ented hy counsel~ On thr contrary, the representa-
toin ""'"a.s of such lo""'" order that it was tantamount to no 
representation. This rase could readily qualify under 
the test of People r. DurpPe. 319 P.2rl :19~ +fl~ 1;)() C1 •. A .. 2(1. 
(iO. \\"']1Pre the ronrt statrrl: 
'·The representation must be of such a lo·w· 
order as to render the trial a farce and a mockery 
of justice ... or it must be sho"\\ .. n that the essen-
tial integrity of the proceeding as a trial " .. a~ de-
~troyPd by thP inrolnpPtency· of eonn~Pl. .. 
This rase substantiate~ the rnlr first statPrl in ni.a.fls r. 
Vir Pl r·h. RO 1~. ~ ... \ pp. D. c·. ;>. 1-+ "'· :.?d ( )( }7. ( }70. 
r 11 the presrnt rase. had ])efendant "Taived the right 
to eounsel at the outRet no greater injury could haYP 
hPfallen hi1n than that "'hirh l1e ~nffered \Yith roun~el 
preHent. 'ThP intnle-d iate pro blen1, then, is to deter1nine 
\\'hat tPRtR have heen fashioned by the rourts "~hirh haYe 
heen ronfronted \Yith rases si1nilar to this raRe and to 
fu rthrr drtPrlnine ""''hethPr t hi~ r:=t ~P ronlrl qn:=t 1 ify· nnrler 
t llP~P tP~·d·~. 
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In P(nrell r . ._<.,Ytate of L1lnbanla, 287 {;.s. -!5, 71, 53 S. 
Ct. 57, 77 L. Ed. 158, the United States Supreme Court 
formulated the test of "substantial representation." That 
i~, unless counsel provides ~ubstantial r<?presentation, 
the Defendant is denied his right to effective counsel. 
Another theory is that Defendant may not complain as to 
the competency of his attorney ' 4Unless the eon duct of 
defense counsel "ras ~o had that the trial judge or prose-
en tor "\\'"as required to act in order to pTeseTve the rights 
of the aecused." llnited Staffs r. Warren, D. l 1• N.Y. 181 
~-,. Supp. 138, ( 1959). Still another test requires that 
defense counsel "vigorously present every legal defen~e 
and represent hiln with his ut1nost skill and ability., . 
. A IJ ralunn r. State, 228 Ind. 179, 91 NE 2d 358, 360, ( 1950) . 
..-\_ fourth t<?st requires that the integrity of the trial be 
destroyed hy counsel's incompetence or that the trial be 
rendered a farce and a mockery of justice: People r. 
/) 11 rJJPP, nri'{Jl/8 1'. "fill Pl rlz. supra. 
J n appl~·ing our casr to the various test fashione-d 
h~T the rourts, there see1ns to be little doubt, if any, that 
t hr trial helo\r \\·a~ rendered a farce and n1ockery of jus-
tier. c•ounsel did not present every rlefense and rep·re-
:-:Pnt defpnflnnt "Tith 111~ uhnost skill. 
~lore ~peeifirall~T· .inter alia, rounsel failed to compel 
the ~tate to prove that the cri1ne \Yas co1nmitted within 
\\"" eber C~ounty and thi~ discrepancy \\·as rorrected only 
Ht the ronPln~ion of the trial anrl hy the judge. Counsel 
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failed to compel the State to prove that the crime ""'"as 
committed at night, a discrepancy which could spell a 
difference between a 1naximum of twenty years imprison-
ment and a maximum of three years. This discrepancy 
"\\'as never corrected. Counsel failed to take the neces-
sary steps to disclose that the State's principal witness 
'vas an established felon. Counsel failed to object to testi-
nlony by the police officers even when by their own 
testimony, these officers indicated that there was a strong 
probability that the evidence was illegally obtained in 
that the officers did not have a warrant for the arrest 
of the Defendant, and thus violated the rule against il-
legal search and seizure. These are the more flagrant 
trespasses upon Defendant's rights under the Due Proc-
ess clause of our Constitution but \ve need not stop here. 
Other discrep·anrie~ arP enlunerated on page three of this 
brief. 
In considering the facts of this case, there appear~ 
to be but one conclusion: Defendant \\""as not afforded 
the effective and competent representation ·w,.hich is guar-
anh•·e<l to hiu1 h~ ... our Constitution; Defendant did not 
rpe:eivP the fair trial conten1plated hy the Due Proc.ess 
clause of the Fifth A1nendn1ent. To arrive at any other 
conclusion 'vould be to condone unscrupulous conduct by 
eonn~~rl. lly c-ondoning such 1nisconduct \Ye destroy the 
integrity of the profession. By placing our sta1np of 
approval on 1nisconduct such as " ... e find in the case before 
thP ( 1onrt, \Yr "Tould hP, in effect, nullifying any Consti-
tutional right~ "'r n1ny have had to a fair trial. 
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Finally, it is convenient to note that our Constitution 
does not distingui~h het,Yeen Defendants 'vho retain 
rounsel~ and Defendants "\Yho have counsels appointed 
to then1. Thus, in determining "\Yhether defendant, in this 
<·a~P, \\·a~ properly represented hy counsel, "'"e ~hould not 
di~ting'ui~h bet,veen retained counsel and appointed coun-
~Pl. In di~cu~~ing this point. the Indiana ~upreme ( 1onrt 
stated: 
"This right (right to effective representation) 
i~ not defeated n1erely beeau~e an accused himself 
e1nploys incon1petent counsel ,, ... ho af'ford inade-
quate representation.'' Abrahnn1 r. Statr. supra. 
The defendant submit~ that he 'vas not adequately 
and competent!~ ... represented at trial and therefore a trial 
de norn should be granted. 
POINT II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDG-
~IENT AND IMPOSING SENTENCE UPON THE CHARGE 
OF SECOND DEGREE BGRGLARY NOTWITHSTANDING 
THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE CRIME WAS 
COMl\liTTED AT NTGHT. 
ln this matter, the State, at best, 'Yas able to provP 
that the c.rime " ... a~ committed • ·shortly after midnight in 
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14 
the early hourse of the morning." (R. 24-9). Our legis-
lators have expressly provided: 
""When in a prosecution for burglary in the 
second degree the question as to whether the crime 
ha~ been committed in the nighttime or in the 
daytime cannot be definitely arrived at by the 
jury, (or trier of the facts) a verdict of guilty of 
burglary in the third degree, as defined in section 
76-9-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, may be found, 
provided, the other elements of the crime of bur-
glary in the third degree, as defined in said section 
76-9-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, have been 
pro\ed.'' Title 76" Chapter 9" Section 3. 
fn analyzing this provision, son1e dispute 1nay arise 
as to "-rhetheT the \Vording of the statute requires that 
thP charge of se~.ond de·gree burglary be automatically 
deereased to third degree burglary or "Thether the Trial 
( 1ourt has the discretion to uphold the conviction on the 
former offense notwithstanding the absence of any evi-
d<-~nre w·hicl1 \vould establish the time the crime \vas com-
lui t tPd. 
J nasmuch as one of the essential ele1nents of second 
<legrPP hurglary i~ that it he con1mitted at night, and in-
~u~Inuch a~ every ele1nent of the crilne 1nust be proved 
hPfor<> the State\~ rase is eomplete, the only logical conclu-
:.;ion ~PPlllH to he that it is incuinbent upon the Di8trict 
.1tldgP to d<'flrea~P th0 ~harge. n~ a 1natter of la\Y·. fron1 
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second degree to third degree if the state fails to prove 
beyond reasonable doubt that the burglary was committed 
at night. 
In the case at bar, the State proved merely that the 
offense was committed ''shortly after midnight in the 
early hours of the morning." Aside from this testimony, 
the record is devoid of any testimony or evidence which 
would tend to establish that the burglary occurred before 
~unru;;e. 
As early as 1907, the Supreme Court of Utah, con-
fronted with a similar fact situation, decided that the 
time of the offense must be conclusively established or 
the charge of second degree hurglary c.annot be sustained. 
ThP ronrt .'-dnferl: 
HFrom the evidence it appears the goods were 
f'tolen sometime between 9 :30 in the evening and 
6 :30 in the morning. But G :30 a.m. is nearly two 
hours after sunrise; hence, if it be admitted that 
the Defendant was proven to have taken the goods, 
~till it is i111possible to say from the pToof that 
he took them in the nighttime, for he may have 
taken them after sunrise and he fore 6 :30 a.m. Nor 
are there any circumstances in evidenee of such 
a character as to shovv bevond a reasonable doubt 
that the prisoner took the goods in the nighttime." 
State ,r.JJ!Nler, (i7 P. 790, 2~ 1 .... 312. 
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Obviously, this case confirms the argument that the 
State must beyond reasonable doubt prove that the crime 
ooourred before sunrise. It "J'ould logically s-eem to follo'v 
that testimony to the effect that the crime was commit-
ted "shortly after midnight in the early hours of the 
morning" does not support the charge of second degree 
burglary beyond reasonable doubt. At best, we may 
harbor suspicions that the burglary occurred in the night-
tirne. In State v. Miller, supra, Justiee Bartch, speaking 
for the SuprPn1e Court of r:tah, stated: 
• '\\r P may f-'Uspieion quite f'trongly that it "Tas, 
( cornmitted at night) but suspicions, ho"\vever 
strong, are not sufficient to convict men of crimes. 
There n1ust he evidence of every element of the 
erin1e and it rnust be of sufficient ,, ... eight to con-
Ylnee an iJnpartial jury beyond a rea.sonab]f\ 
tlouht.·· 
']~his is the only lT tah ease in point, but courts of our 
sister states have arrived at the same conclusion as the 
~uprPnH) (~onrt of Utah did in ... ~filler. SU})ra. 
ln Sta.te 'L'. ~F'N.zpatri,ck, 239 P. 2d 529, 1251\font. 4:-!S, 
thP Snprerne Court o'f l\lontana indicated that 'vhere the 
jnfor1nation sperifirall~.,. charges a nighttime burglary, 
tlH~ TlefPndant cannot he convicted 1mless the State 
proved beyond a reasonahle doubt. that f'uch burglary 
\\~a~ <~onnni tterl beforP ( 3 :56 a.1n.) the time of sunrise 
on~ t'ltP 1norning- the rriHH' ""''ft~ discovered. Moreover~ the 
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eourt indicated that it is not sufficient to convict the 
Defendant where the evidence merely "discloses that the 
hurglary was committed betw,.een 3 :15 a.m. when the club 
building closed and 8:00 a.m. 'vhen it next opened." 
The Supreme Court of Kansas, in State v. Dough-
erty, indicated that, "'here a person is charged 'vith a 
nighttime erime, it is not enough to show that the crime 
occurred bet\veen 7 :30 p.m. and 9 :30 p.m. when the record 
disclosed that the sun set at 7:52 p~.m. 352 P. 2d 1031, 
1R6 Kan. 820, ( 1960). The court further stated: 
''Where there is nothing to show that the 
entry 1nay not have been made and that property 
taken during the daytime, the, jury is not warrant-
ed in finding the entry 'Yas made in the nighttime. 
In State v. Rice, 93 l{an. 589, 14-l- P. 1016, we held 
that where defendant was convicted of burglary in 
the nighttime without evidence showing at what 
time the offense ":as committed, burglary in the 
daytime being the lesser of the two offenses, the 
presumption in favor of the defendant is that the 
crime U'as committed in the ~daytime." State 'l'. 
Douqherty, ~upra, pp. 1031-32. 
As Chief Justice Brontly of the Supreme Court of 
~ron tan a. BfafPrl: 
'~When the pleader, as in this case, 1nakes the 
specific eha rge of a burglary in the night6me ... 
he must he held to the proof of the eharges as 
made .... '' State v. J?ifzpatrick. ~upra. 
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In the case at bar, the State has eharged a nighttime 
crime, namely; burglary in the second degree. It was 
thus incumbent upon the prosecution, as pleader, to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was committed 
he-fore sunrise. The State failed to earry this burden of 
proof to a sufficient and convincing degree and the court 
:-;hould thPrefore remand this case to the District Court 
\vith an order to eorrect this error. 
POINT III. 
THE DISTRICT COURT DENIED DEFENDANT THE 
FAIR TRIAL PROVIDED FOR BY T·HE DUE PROCESS 
CLAUSE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE CON-
STITUTION O~F THE UNITED STATES IN IMPOSING 
SENTENCE UPON DEFENDANT IN THE ABSENCE OF 
HIS A'TTORNEY. 
As is (•vidence b~,. the reeord on appeal (R. 24-4A) 
upon request of defense counseL the date and tin1e for 
~entencing \\,.as ~Pt for July 10, 1961, at 2 :00 p.m. Ho",._ 
Pver. aR the record indicates, (R. 2-!-4A) the court helo"" 
.i1nposed ~0ntence nt 10:00 a.1n. on thP day in question 
in <lflfPn~(' ronnsel's absenrP. 
lipon this i~~lH\ the Inajority of the courts seen1 
to hold "·ith the rule that defendant is entitled to have 
eoun~el prc·~('nt r1t the ti1ne judgment i~ entered and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
sentence is imposed unless Defendant clearly and in-
telligently \Yaives his right to counsel. The rule is best 
stated in People v. Fields, Cal. App., 198 P. 2d 104, (1948) 
in which the California Court held: 
Hinasmuch as the arrignment for judgment 
and pronouncing of judgment are clearly a phase 
of eriminal prosecution, the defendant herein was 
denied that constitutional right." 
In a more recent case, the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia affirmed this rule and hrld: 
"The denial of counsel at sentence is a denial 
of a constitutional right." Ex Parte Tu1~rieta; 2 
Cal. Reporter, 884, 886, ( 1960). 
"Gpon this precise point, to-wit: the entering of judg-
n1ent and imposition of sentence in counsel's absence, 
the case at bar appears to be one of first imp~ression in 
this court. Ho"Tever, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Cirruit has clearly indieated its vie\\rs upon this problem. 




'Ve believe that an accused should have the 
opportunity to be heard by counsel on the sentence 
to be imposed, and thata court should not imp,ose 
sentence in the absence of counsel \vithout ex-
pressly ascertaining that a defendant does not 
desire his presenre. 1Ia.ny c.on~iderations in-
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fluenee the length of a sentence which is to be 
imposed, and a defendant should have the oppor-
tunity to have his attorney present any mitigating 
circumstances to the court for its consideration 
in d(_)termining- the """eight of the sentence.'' 
In WNl.is t'. Hunter, this same court again empha-
sized the importanrP of counsel's presence at sentencing. 
The court s·tated: 
''Since the right to counsel is a matter of 
substance, not of form, it is the solemn duty of 
the trial judge to make sure that representation 
is not an empty gesture but a fulfillment of the 
spirit and purpose of the constitutional mandate." 
~'\\T e think that the right to effectiYe assist-
arrce of rounsel contemplates the guiding hand of 
an able and responsiv·e la-\Yyer, devoted solely to 
the intere~t of hi~ client: "\Yho h.as runple oppor-
tunity to acquaint himself "ith the law and the 
facts of the case, and is afforded an opportunity 
to present then1 to thP court or jury in their 
u1ost favorable light. If an accused does not have 
thP assistanre of eolmsel """hen entering a plea 
or "'"hen sentence is in1posed, it must be clear to 
the court that he has con1petently and intelligent-
ly "\\Taived such rig-ht.'' 166 F. 2d 7~1, 723, ( CA 
·10th Ci r. 1 n++). 
In thP r.n~P at bar, defendant did not 'Yaive his right 
to <·oun~el at an~~ sta_ge of th0 prore·edin.g. On tl1e con-
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trary, defense counsel expressly indicated that he would 
he at the sentencing. The court below nevertheless en-
tered judgment and imposed sentence in counsel's ab-
sence. Clearly defendant was denied his right to have 
counsel present at every stage of the proceeding and 
'vas consequently denied a substantial right under our 
Constitution. 
upon these grounds, the eause should be remanded 
to the District Court to remedy this error. 
The defendant, in the case before the Court, was 
clearly denied the fair trial "rhich the Due Process Clause 
of our Conf;titution insures us . 
.Jioreover, the trial judge, in failing to decrease the 
charge against defendant from burglary in the Recond 
degree to burglary in the third degree, failed to give the 
dPfendant the benefit of the prestm1ption, as provided hy 
our ~tatnte~~ that the le~~Pr <'Tilne "'"as eo1nmitted. 
Finally, defendant"~ constitutional rights were fur-
ther infringed upon hy the fact tha;t the trial court en-
tered judgrnent and impo~ed ~(}ntence upon the defendant 
in defense counsel'~ absence. 
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J~ ~~ upholding the aeeision of the lo,ver eourt and by 
placing our ~ta.1np of a pproYa 1 upon it. ,,.P in fact con-
clone thP 1ni~earriage of justi(le nnd encourau-.-. the trP~.:­
ll~l ~~ npo11 onr eiyjl lihertjr~"-
T'hp defendant subn1it~. thi~ cause should be remand-
P(l to the Di~trirt ·Con rt 'Yith an order for a trinl r1 P noro. 
:JIIT~.1~X .. \n~\ & RO~~ 
and 
!-~ r1~XXJ~:TH -:\f. IIIS.A. T .A T~F: 
411 to r n e y s tor . .:1 p pe ll nn t 
1 O:l l~n1pi.re Building 
·2:~1 J·~. Fourth Snnth 
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